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I
INTRODUCTION
In the 10 years after the debt crisis began in 1982, many events
transpired and among the most significant were the continued
rescheduling of developing country debts and the emergence of a
secondary market for these loans. More and more, free market
"solutions" were being hailed as the means of finally resolving the
debt burden of developing countries. From the onset of the debt
crisis, financial markets produced a steady stream of instruments to
deal with developing country debts in ways that reflected their market
value. A secondary market for these sovereign debt papers has now
become too obvious, prevalent and persistent to ignore.
Sovereign debt secondary market prices have, in fact, been used
to evaluate the costs and benefits of the debt restructuring proposals
of Sachs (1989) and Robinson (1989). These prices have also been
employed as indicators of debt values in several of the individual
country schemes being implemented under the umbrella of the Brady
Plan. These applications of foreign loan market prices were based on
the assumption that they are reliable indicators of debt values.
However, ifmarket imperfections draw awedge between investor debt
appraisals and reported prices, then the valuation of debt
restructuring based on market quotes may not be capturing investor
expectations (Stone 1991).
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What is interesting about the secondary market for sovereign debts
is the fact that this "market" was not about a group of disinterested,
faceless, passive or unsophisticated investors. The original holders of
debt (i.e., the commercial banks that lent money in the first place)
were themselves the principal participants in the market. The same
banks were bailing out at huge discounts while trading among
themselves.
In analyzing whether secondary market prices are reliable
indicators of debt values, the extent to which various dimensions of
country risk determine such values will be tested. It is argued that
secondary market sovereign debt prices were significantly influenced
by the same economic risk factors that explained debt rescheduling,
as well as by bankers' perceptions of creditworthiness. The choice of
variables reflecting a country's economic conditions is based on
previous empirical country risk studies. These variables have been
found to significantly influence a country's probability of
rescheduling. Bankers' perceptions which could not be observed,
on the other hand, is dealt with by utilizing the Institutional Investor
Country Risk Rating (IICR).
The IICR is taken from a biannual (March and September) survey
by the Institutional Investor, an international finance magazine based
in New York. The survey, which started in the late 1970s, covers from
75 to 100 of the most active banks involved in international lending.
Bankers are asked to assign a score, on. a scale of 0 to 100, to different
countries according to their perception' of a country's cbances of
running into debt-servicilag difficulties. A rating of zero represents
the least creditworthiness with the highest probability ofrescheduling
while a grade of 100 represents the highest rating of creditworthiness
with the least chance of having debt-servicing difficulties. The
individual responses are averaged using a weighing procedure which
gives more weight to banks with the largest worldwide exposure and
the most sophisticated country risk analysis systems. This paper startsPALAC-MCMIKEN: PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 91
with the conviction that these scores are a reasonable measure of
bankers' perceptions of the creditworthiness of countries which
influence their bid prices for sovereign debt papers traded in the
secondary market.
II
THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT
The original premise, both in the restructuring process and of the
bank advisers that ran it, was that the principal portion of the debt
could be maintained at par value through debt rescheduling. The
market rejected this premise right from the start. With every reduction
in spread, every extension of grace period and/or maturity, and every
advance of new money, the value of the debt declined in the secondary
market. In fact, the relationship betWeen the concessionary terms of
rescheduling and the market value of sovereigt_ debt is so direct that
the rescheduling process can be used to help map the persistent
decline in the market value of developing cotmtry debt over the years.
Initially, the secondary market for" sovereign debt evolved to
facilitate bank loan swapping aimed at reweighing portfolio exposure
in preferred countries to reduce risk (Sand 1987). In addition to
portfolio realignment, traders were also motivated by tax
considerations. For example, the secondary market provided a
profitable opportunity for commercial banks to reduce their tax
liabilities by writing down developing countries' debts.
The introduction of formal debt conversion schemes in several
major debtor countries (eg., Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and
the Philippines) after 1984, stimulated the growth of the secondary
market for sovereign debt, particularly in cash transactions. The
schemes included the conversion of debt into equity and debt
repurchases by countries at a discount. From $1 billion of assets traded
in 1984, the market trading volume rose to around $6 billion in 198592 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and 1986 and $12 billion the following year. Large-scale commercial
bank selloffs contributed to a quadrupling of the volume to $50 billion
in 1988 'and $80 billion in 1989. In 1990, the volume reached $100
billion and was estimated by Salornon Brothers to have reached more
than $120 billion in 199].. Trading in the debt obligations of
Argentina, Chile and Colombia accounted for most of the volume.
Secondary market transactions have also been facilitated by the
emergence of market-makers (e.g., Salomon Brothers, Citibank, Libra
Bank, J.P. Morgan, and Nederlansche Middensandsbank) who
specialize in developing country debts by matching buyers and sellers
and/or trading for their own accounts.
Table 1 shows the rescheduling history of 68 countries and the
secondary market prices of debt claims against these countries. For
the unobserved prices, it is assumed that they maintain a 100 percent
face value. If the debt claims are unquoted, then presumably the
commercial banks still value them at par in their books. Except in
the case of Algeria and Hungary, all nonrescheduling countries' debts
have remained untraded. Thus, their secondary prices are unobserved
and assumed to have maintained their 100 percent face value.: Both
the debts of Algeria and Hungary have been quoted below par, despite
the fact that these countries never formally signed a multilateral
rescheduling agreement. For all the rescheduling countries in the
sample, with the exception of E1Salvador, the data clearly show that
prices of the debt claims against them were significantly discounted
against their face values.
In a sample of 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries, only
Paraguayan, Guatemalan and Haitian debts maintained their value
at par. Except for E1 Salvador, the rest which rescheduled at least
once during the period 1978-1990 suffered large discounts. El
Salvador's debt remained untraded, thus unquoted, and is assumed
to have maintained its face value despite having been rescheduled in
1990. Latin American and Caribbean debt suffered large declines inTable 1 _,
r-
RESCHEDULING HISTORY AND SECONDARY MARKET
SOVEREIGN DEBT PRICES" __
O
Sample Rescheduling history 1986 1987, 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
m
countries z
Latin America and the Caribbean -o -n
1. Argentina 1983,1985,1987,1989 65.0 47.0 25.0 16.0 13.0 27.0 44.0
2. Barbados None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 o -4
3. Bolivia 1980,1981,1983,1986, 1988, 1990 6.0 9.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 _.
4. Brazil 1983,1984,1986,1987, 1988 75.0 53.0 47.0 30.0 25.0 29.0 36.0 ¢)
5. Chile 1983,1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990 66.0 63.0 59.0 60.0 68.0 85.0 89.0 _-c_
6. Colombia 1985, 1989 82.0 79.0 66.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 8
7. Costa Rica 1983,1985,1989 44.0 29.0 13.0 14.0 29.0 45.0 53.0 c
8. Ecuador 1983,1985,1987,1988, 1989 65.0 44.0 24.0 13.0 t6.0 23.0 25.0 -4 co
9. EISalvador 1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 t00.0 100.0 100.0
10. Guatemala None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
11. Haiti None 100.0 100.0 t.00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
12. Honduras 1983,1984,1987,1989, 1990 40.0 34.0 23.0 17.0 20.0 20.0 27,0
13. Mexico 1983,1984, t985,1986, 1987,1988,
1989,1990 58.0 53.0 48.0 40.0 42.0 55.0 63.0
14. Morocco 1983,1985,1986,1987, 1988,1990 68.0 52.0 48.0 38.0 39.0 47.0 44.0
15. Nicaragua 1980,1981,1982,1984 4.0 4.0 2.0 t.0 3.0 5.0 8.0
16. Panama t983_1985 69.0 56.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
17. Paraguay None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
18. Peru 1978,1980,1983,1984 19.0 11.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 8.0 14.0
19. Uruguay 1983, 1986, 1988 64.0 68.0 60.0 55.0 49.0 62.0 71.0





Sample Rescheduling history 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
countries
North Africa and the Middle East
21.Algeria None 100,0 t00,0 100,0 77.0 81.0 84.0 85,0
22, Egypt 1987 100.0 100.0 100.0 39.0 41,0 44.0 48.0
23. Iran None 100.0 100.0 100;0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0
24. Iraq None 100,0 100,0-100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0
25. Kuwait None 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0
26. Oman None 100,0 100,0 100,0 1,00.0 100.0 100.0 100,0
27. SaudiArabia None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
28. Syria None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0
29. Tunisia None 100.0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 c
30.Yemen -n
Arab Rep. None 100.0 t00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 t00.0
Asia and the Pacific O
31. Afghanistan None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 t00.0 100.0 100.0 -o-n
32. Australia None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 _i r-.
33. Myanmar -o
(Burma) None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 _-o
34. China None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 m E_
35. Fiji None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 <_
36. Hongkong None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 m
37. India None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 o "O
38. indonesia None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 m
z
--ITable 1 continued -_
r-
_>
Sample Rescheduling history 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 _:
countries o
;X
39.Korea, South None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 m z
40. Malaysia None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
-,1
41. New Zeatand None 100.0 100.0 100.0 .100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 m
42. Pakistan 1981 t00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - c)
43. Papua New
Guinea None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
44. Philippines 1984. 1986, 1987, 1989. 1990 64.0 63.0 52.0 47.0 45.0 48.0 53.0
CO
45. Singapore None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 o
O
46. SriLanka None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 c-
47. Taiwan None 100.0 100.0 100.0 t00.0 t00.0 100.0 100.0 z
48. Thailand None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 .!00.0 co
Europe and the Mediterranean
49. Cyprus None 100.0 100.0 t00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
50. Greece None 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 I00.0 100.0
51. Hungary None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
52. Israel None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
53. Portugal None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
54. Spain None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Africa, South of Sahara
55. Botswana None 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
56. Ethiopia None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0





Sample Rescheduling history 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
countries
58. Ivory Coast 1984,1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 75.0 61.0 29.0 11.0 _ 4.0 6.0 8.0
59. Kenya None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 t00.0 t00.0 100.0
60. Madagascar None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
6t. Malta None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
62. Mauritania None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
63. Mauritius None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 c- ::o
64. Rwanda None 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 z >
65, Senegal 1981,1982,1983,1984, 1985, 1986, r-
1987,1989,1990 68.0 61.0 47.0 47.0 34.0 38.0 43.0 O
66. South Africa None 100.0 I00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
67. Togo None 100.0 100.0 100.0 t00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 _
68. UpperVolta None 100.0 100.0 100.0 I00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
m
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value from 1986 to 1990 but exhibited some recovery in 1991 and
1992.
The value of Nicaraguan debt was almost nil in 1989 ( i.e., only 1
percent of its face value), and although it recovered slightly in the
later years, it was still below 10 percent of its face value in 1992 (i.e.,
8 percent). Bolivian debt was also valued for as low as 6 percent in
1986 but had recovered slightly to 11 percent in 1992. Also in 1992,
the debts of Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay exhibited
dramatic increases, registering values higher than their 1.986 levels.
For the rest of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, debt
values exhibited some significant increases, but still had not regained
their 1986 levels by 1992.
For the North African and Middle East regions, only Egyptian
an d Algerian debts traded below par, with the rest of the Middle East
countries' debts remaining unquoted, implying that they retained
100 percent of their face values. As mentioned earlier, Algerian debts
have been traded and quoted below par even though Algeria had
not rescheduled any of its debts.
In the case of Asia and the Pacific region, only the debt of the
Philippines was quoted below par from 1986 to 1992. Although the
country's debt exhibited a slight improvement after 1990, it had not
yet fully recovered from the 1986 level, and was stilljust over 50 percent
of its face value in 1992.
ivory Coast and Senegal were two of the African countries whose
debts were quoted below par. Ivory Coast's debt showed a dramatic
decline, from 75 percent of its face value in 1986 down tojust 4 percent
in 1989. Although its value increased slightly to 8 percent in 1992, it
was still, practically, worthless. Consistent with the upward trend in
secondary market sovereign debt prices in 1990, Senega!'s debt also
showed some improvement in 1991 and 1992, after a continuous
decline from 1986 to 1990.98 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Figure 1 shows the price of sovereign debt computed as an
unweighted mean of average monthly country quotes from 1986
through 1992. Four years after the Mexican debt crisis and the
subsequent emergence of the secondary market, the figure clearly
shows that the debts of countries which rescheduled are way below
their face values. The secondary market sovereign debt prices
experienced sharp and continuous declines from 1986 to 1988. In
Figure 1
SECONDARY MARKET SOVEREIGN DEBT PRICES
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the succeeding years, the market reflected a continued lack of
confidence, with the movement still on a downward trend and
reaching bottom in 1990. After 1990, however, the market Started to
exhibit an upward -trend which reflected the. restoration of some
confidence in sovereign lending.
III
THE MODEL
it is presumed that objective risks arising from the economic, political
and social conditions of a country and the bankers' subjective
perceptions of that country's creditworthiness influence the prices
of its sovereign debts which are traded in the secondary market. The
selection of the risk factors is based on the study of Palac-Mcmiken
(1995) as well as on other empirical work concerning country risk
analysis. The full empirical model that will be tested can then be
expressed as follows:
DISC = _(IICR, DSR, FDMP, _RSKX, INF, RESIMP,
+ + +
OPNINDX, PCON, AGRGDP, GNPPC) (1)
- + + -
where
DISC = percent discount oil sovereign debt measured
as the difference between the full face value
of the debt (i.e., percent) and its secondary
market average bid price;
IICR = a measure of the bankers' perception of
country creditworthiness;100 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
DSR = ratio of originally scheduled amortization and
interest payments to total export receipts;
FDMP = ratio of noncompressible (food) imports to
total imports;
ZRSKX =" cumulative rescheduling experience;
RESIMP = ratio of reserves (minus gold) to total imports
INF = rate of inflation
OPNINDX = measure of a country's degree of openness
defined as half the sum of impoprts and
exports divided by the sum of gross domestic
product and imports;
PCON = share of private consumption in gross domestic
product;
AGRGDP = share of agriculture in gross domestic product;
and
GNPPC = per capita income.
The signs expected and the hypothesis for each of the explanatory
variables follow.
Bankers' Creclltworthiness Assessment (HCR)
A negative relationship is hypothesized between the Institutional
investor Country Risk (IICR) and the sovereign debt discounts. Since
the principal participants in the secondary market are the same banks
who are the original holders of debt, it is presumed that their
subjective perceptions of country creditworthiness proxied by the
IICR rating would guide their debt valuation, and that will be reflected
in the discounts of sovereign debt traded in the secondary market.
Debt claims on countries perceived as more creditworthy by these
banks would tend to be quoted at lower discounts (or very close to
par) while debt claims on countries perceived to be less creditworthy
will tend to be quoted at higher discounts. In fact, a counu'y perceivedPALAC-MCMIKEN:PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 101
to be high risk may be given limited access to voluntary commercial
finance. This can contribute to its vulnerability to external shocks,
thereby increasing that country's probability of debt rescheduling
and making it more likely that its debt will be traded in the secondary
market at a discount.
Debt Service Ratio (DSR)
A positive relationship is hypothesized between debt service ratio
(DSR) and sovereign debt discounts. For a debtor country to have
uninterrupted access to external credit, it must be able to continue
servicing its debt. It is postulated that the price of nonrescheduling is
the necessity to honor scheduled debt service payments. It is the
current and prospective payments required to service external debt
that constitute the price of nonrescheduling. It can be proxied by
the contractual debt service ratio or by the ratio of the originally
scheduled amortization and interest payments to total export receipts
(DSR). As a country's price of nonrescheduling rises directly with its
debt service ratio, it should be positively correlated with its probability
of rescheduling. This is supported by empirical studies of various
authors (Frank and Cline 1971; Feder, Just, and Ross 1981; and many
others). Since debt rescheduling implies that the original terms of
the debt will no longer be honored, the implication is that the debt
claim has lost its original value and will more likely be traded at a
discount in the secondary market. Thus, the higher a country's debt
service ratio, the more likely that its sovereign debt will be quoted at
a higher discount.
Ratio of Noncompressible (Food) Import
to Total Imports (FDMP)
A negative relationship is hypothesized between the ratio of
noncompressible (food) import to total imports (FDMP) and
sovereign debt discounts. The FDMP has been used as an indicator102 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
to represent the price (opportunity cost) of rescheduling which
reflects a country's walnerability to a credit embargo (Solberg 1988;
Palac-Mcmiken 1993). As a country's price of rescheduling rises with
its FDMP, it should be negatively correlated with rescheduling. There
is empirical evidence to support this (Solberg 1988; Palac-McMiken
1993). The argument is that a reduced access to external credit
following a debt rescheduling results in foreg_one credit-based
noncompressible imports (which are mostly food items). A country
that is not self-sufficient and that has to rely on imports to provide
the most basic needs of its population may not risk a decision (that is,
rescheduling) that would lead to further diminution of its access to
external finance. Thus, the higher a country's FDMP, the less likely
that it will reschedule and the more likely that its sovereign debt would
be quoted close to par.
Cumulative Reseheduling Experience (ERSKX)
A positive relationship is hypothesized between cumulative
rescheduling experience (ZRSKX) and sovereign debt discounts.
Regardless of whether debt rescheduling may lead to a renegotiation
which, in the final analysis, becomes favorable to a debtor country,
rescheduling always tarnishes a country's reputation in the financial
community. This will, in all likelihood, diminish a country's access to
voluntary external financing. The rollover of that country's debt may
no longer be possible as all its unpaid debts may even become due
and demandable. Thus, the more frequent a country reschedules its
debt, the stronger the signal that the debtor country is not able get
out of the debt trap, and thus, the more likely that its sovereign debt
would be discounted at a higher rate.
Ratio of Reserves (Minus Gold) to Total Imports (RESIMP)
A negative relationship is hypothesized between the ratio of
reserves (minus gold) to total imports (RESIMP) and sovereign debt
discounts. This variable has been frequently used as a measure of aPALAC-MCMIKEN:PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 103
country's liquidity position. It is argued that a higher level of reserves
serves as a buffer against foreign exchange earnings fluctuations while
an inadequate level of reserves to pay:for imports can lead to liquidity
problems. Various authors have shown the negative effect of RESIMP
on a country's probability of rescheduling (Frank and Cline 1971;
Feder and Just 1977; Feder, Just and Ross 1981; Mayo and Barret
1978; and Cline 1984,). Since, by implication, the higher a country's
RESIMP the lower the probability of debt rescheduling, it is more
likely that a country with a strong liquidity position will have its
sovereign debt quoted close to par.
Inflation Rate (INF)
A positive relationship is hypothesized between the inflation rate
(INF) and sovereign debt discounts. It is argued that, since exchange
rates do not necessarily compensate, the international competitiveness
of a country's exporters may be hampered if it has an above-average
inflation differential with its major trading partners. High inflation
implies higher labor costs and higher costs for domestically purchased
intermediate goods. High inflation also reduces the relative price of
imports. All these have negative effects on a country's foreign
exchange operations and will consequen flyaffect that country's debt-
servicing capacity. The negative arid significant infuence of inflation
on a country's probability of rescheduling has been found by various
authors (Sargen 1977; Abassi and Taffler 1982), Thus, since the
probability that a country would reschedule its debt rises with its rate
of inflation, then it is more likely that a country exhibiting high rates
of inflation will have its sovereign debt quoted at a higher discount if
traded in the secondary market.
Openness Index (OPNINDX)
A negative relationship is hypothesized between openness index
(OPNINDX) and sovereign debt discounts. It is argued that a more
open economy can easily adjust to balance-of-payments constraints104 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
because an aggregate demand policy will have a stronger impact on
imports. Moreover, the more open an economy, the more likely that
its domestic producers are experienced in world markets and the
easier for them to shift from domestic markets to export markets. As
a result of the greater flexibility enjoyed by more open economies, a
greater degree of openness is expected to reduce the probability of
rescheduling. There is empirical evidence to support this (Callier
1985). In the same vein, it can be argued that countries exhibiting a
greater degree of openness would more likely have their sovereign
debt quoted close to par.
Share of Private Consumption in GDP (PCON)
A positive relationship is hypothesized between the share of private
consumption in GDP (PCON) and sovereign debt discounts. The
PCON may be taken to represent the share of production allocated
to consumption as opposed to the accumulation of real capital assets.
It is argued that nonaccumulation of real capital assets may decrease
a country's future productive capacity. This, in effect, decreases tile-
amount of real resources that will be available for a country to service
its debt in the future, hence, increasing its probability of rescheduling,
Thus, since a country's probability ofrescheduling rises with PCON,
it is more likely that debt claims against countries allocating more of
their resources to private consumption will be traded at a higher
discount.
Share of Agriculture in GDP (AGRGDP)
A positive relationship is hypothesized between the share of
agriculture in GDP (AGRGDP) and sovereign debt discounts. The
AGRGDP may be taken as a variable to indicate a country's flexibility
in allocating its resources, with a high ratio implying a highly rigid
economy. This rigidity can greatly constrain a country's ability to adjust
to balance-of-payments problems, and is thus expected to have aPALAC-MCMIKEN:PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 105
positive effect on its probability of rescheduling. The argument for
this is taken from the concept of "dualism" which is widely discussed
in the economic development literature of developing countries.
According to this concept, the economy is divided into two sectors:
the rural agricultural sector and the modern industrial sector. Between
these two sectors (i.e., agricultural and industrial), resources do not
flow freely to maintain marginal conditions usually associated with
conditions of efficiency in resource allocation. For a basically
agricultural country, the tendency to cut production in the industrial
sector to reduce imports may serve as the only mechanism available
to restore current account balance. The possibility of an efficient
reallocation of resources can therefore be very limited in such an
economy. Moreover, a higher AGRGDP may also imply that the
country is highly dependent on agricultural exports. Since world
agricultural prices exhibit greater variance, then a basically
agricultural country would be more vulnerable to foreign exchange
fluctuations. Since the prospect of rescheduling increases with
AGRGDP, it is also more likely that debt claims against countries
exhibiting higher AGRGDP will be quoted below par.
GNP Per Capita (GNPPC)
A negative relationship is hypothesized between GNP per capita
(GNPPC) and sovereign debt discounts_ Assuming a declining
marginal propensity to consume, poorer countries may have a
stronger resistance than richer countries to reduce consumption
following a debt rescheduling. The positive and significant
relationship between a country's GNPPC and its probability of
rescheduling had been established by various authors (Feder and
Just 1977; McFadden et al. 1985; and Berg and Sachs 1988). Since
countries with higher per capita GNP are less likely to reschedule,
then it is more likely for debt claims against these countries to be
quoted close to par.106 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
IV
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
It will be assumed that the discount on the debt is a nonlinear function
of country risk factors. This nonlinearity arises from the fact that the
discount on the debt can be posifve or zero but never negative. For
countries that have rescheduled, the discount tends to be positive,
while for countries that have not rescheduled, the discount is assumed
to be zero (or close to zero). Ill practice, this latter assumption may
be violated in very few cases. Cases of Algerian and Hungarian debt
were cited earlier. For most nonrescheduling countries, however, tile
secondary market price of the debt is not publicly quoted. For these
unobseved discounts, we can assume that the actual market discount
is equal to zero. This is deemed to be a reasonable assumption because
if the country's debt has in fact been traded at a discount, the
secondary market price of the country's debt would have been quoted.
A Tobit model will be used to test tbr the factors that determine
the size of the discounts oil the debt. Let Y*i be a latent
creditworthiness variable for country i, which is only observed if it is
nonnegative and otherwise takes the value of zero. It is a function of
the explanatory variables X_ and a random error e i distributed
normally, so that
Y*_ : _'X + E, (2)
where X is a vector of objective and subjective risk indicators and _ a
vector of coefficients. In general, Y*, may represent a threshold for
rescheduling. Higher Y*i signifies lower creditworthiness. For Y*i less
than or equal to zero, the actual discount Y is equal to zero, while for
Y*_greater than zero, the actual discount is set equal to Y'i" That is,PALAC-MCMIKEN: PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 107
Y = 0 for Y*_ < 0 (3)
_=Y*_ for Y*,>0
In this case, the regression flmction can be written as:
E[Y / X,, Y > 0] -- [_'X,+ E (c, / Y > 0), i = 1,...N-s (4)
where of the total N observations, the last ZY's are zero, but Y, i --
1,....N-s are observable. There is no problem if the conditional
expectation of the error term is zero since the least squares regression
on N-s available observations provide an unbiased estimator of _.
This is not the case, however, since as is assumed to be an independent
and normally distributed random variable, with mean zero and
variance c 2,hence,
E[c,/Y,> 0] =E[E,/c,>- _'X,]=c_. (5)
where
_.,= f(y)/1-F(y,), y, =- _'X/o-
and f(.) and F(.) are, respectively, the density and CDF of a standard
normal random variable. Thus, the regression function can finally
be written as:
E[Y/X,, Y_ > 0] = _'X, +aX,, for i = 1..... N-s. (6)
In general, the least squares estimator of [3 is biased and
inconsistent, using either the entire sample or the subsample of
complete observations (Greene 1981; Golberger 1981)_ Maximum
likelihood estimation using Newton's algorithm method will be used
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The empirical testing utilized a pooled sample of at most 56
countries within the period of 1986 to 1988. Data on secondary market
prices were taken from the World Bank and Salomon Bros.' "Indicative
Prices of Developing Country Debts. '' Monthly bids for a $100 debt
to financial institutions are averaged to get the annual average bid
price. Sovereign debt discount is simply the difference between the
face value (i.e., 100 percent) and the annual average bid price. Data
for the explanatory variables, on the other hand, were primarily taken
from the Institutional Investor, World Development Report, International
Financial Statistics, and World Debt Tables.In order to take account of
the time lags involved in data availability, a one-year lag was chosen
for the explanatory variables.
To test how the various dimensions of country risk affect the rate
of discount on sovereign debt and to isolate the extent of influence
of objective vis-a-vis the subjective risk factors, three regression
equations were estimated. The results are discusssed in the succeeding
section.
V
REGRESSION AND PREDICTION RESULTS
Subjective Model
The first regression equation may be referred to as a "subjective"
model because it is estimated using only IICR as the explanatory
variable. This allows the study to determine the extent to which
bankers' creditworthiness assessments influence secondary market
sovereign debt discounts. The sovereign debt discount predictions
of this model can also shed light on the extent to which sovereign
debt valuations in the secondary market deviate from bankers' (the
principal participants in the secondary market who are themselves
the original holders of debts) valuations on the basis of their
assessment of countries' creditworthiness. The model was regressedPALAC-MCMIKEN: PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 109
on a pooled sample of 168 observations (56 x 3 = 168), 32 percent
(54/168) of which has a positive dependent variable (i. e., Y*_> 0)
The estimated result is given below:
DISC = 63.49 - 2.55 (!ICR,.I) (7)
(5.46)(-6.07)
R2 -- 0.25 Log-likelihood _-_336.81
As expected, IICR has a negative and significant influence on
sovereign debt discounts. Debt claims on countries perceived as more
creditworthy tend to be quoted with lower discounts. The model can
explain 25 percent of the variation in DISC.
Consider the within-sample prediction results of the above
estimated equation listed in Table 2. P(D) - A(D) shows the absolute
difference between the predicted discount and the actual discount
quoted in the secondary market. On the basis of bankers'
creditworthiness assessment alone, the debt papers of El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Haiti and Guatemala should have been quoted at a discount
of over 37 percent from 1986 to 1988, similar to those of other Latin
American countries. But since debt claims against these countries
remained untraded or unquoted at that time, their secondary prices
were unobserved and presumed to have maintained their value at
par (i.e., zero discount). The model almost correctly predicts the
zero discounts for the debts of Canada, Australia, Singapore, China,
Hong Kong, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia,.Spain and Taiwan, with
predicted discounts of less than l percent. On the average, the model
overpredicts the unquoted sovereign debts by a little over 11 percent
from 1986 to 1988.
In the case of quoted debt claims, except for Senegal's debt in
1986, the model underpredicts all of them. The model fails miserably
in predicting discounts on Latin American debt, particularly forPeru,Table 2 o
SUBJECTIVE MODEL SOVEREIGN DEBT DISCOUNT PREDICTIONS
Sample 1986 1987 1988
countries A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D)
1 Algeria 0.00 2.13 2.t3 0.00 2.13 2.13 0.00 4.36 4.36
2 Australia 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 0,06 0.00 0.t2 0.12
3 Barbados 0,00 I2.29 12.29 0.00 13.26 13.26 0.00 11.04 11.04
4 Canada 0.00 0.02 0.02 0_00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
5 China 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.44 0.44
6 Cyprus 0.00 10.26 10.26 0.00 8.10 8.10 0.00 7.18 7.18
7 El Salvador 0.00 47.66 47.66 0.00 47.99 47.99 0.00 45.51 45.51
8 Ethiopia 0.00 45.51 45.51 0.00 44.68 44.68 0.00 43.37 43.3.7
9 Greece 0.00 2.53 2.53 0.00 3.33 3.33 0,00 3.98 3,98
10 Guatemala 0.00 37.40 37.40 0.00 38.03 38.03 0,00 37.08 37.08
c
11 Haiti 0.00 43.20 43.20 0.00 43.53 43.53 0.00 42.38 42.38 -n
12 Hongkong 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.32 0.32 z t-
13 Hungary 0.00 3.87 3.87 0.00 2.53 2.53 0.00 3.05 3.05 O
14 India 0.00 4.34 4.34 0.00 3.14 3.14 0.00 2.79 2.79 -11 -o
t5 Indonesia 0.00 3.17 3.17 0.00 3.08 3.08 0.00 4.52 4.52 -r
16 tran 0.00 28.50 28.50 0.00 29.65 29.65 0.00 27.66 27.66 __
I7 Iraq 0.00 27.10 27.10 0.00 28.22 28.22 0.00 31.71 3t.71 -o z
18 Israel 0.00 16.16 16.16 0.00 16.27 16.27 0.00 12.29 12,29 m
19 Kenya 0.00 t7.65 17.65 0.00 15.55 15.55 0.00 14.86 14.86 m
20 Korea, South 0.00 1.29 1.29 0.00 1.43 1.43 0.00 1o03 t.03 < m
21 Kuwait 0.00 0.64 0.64 0.00 0.62 0.62 0.00 1.16 1116 r- O
22 Malaysia 0.00 0.51 0.51 0.00 0.66 0.66 0.00 1.43 1.43 -o






Sample 1986 1987 1988 c) _¢
countries A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A(D) P(D) P(D)-A(D)
Ill
Z
24 New Zealand 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.43 0.43 -o
•. "IR
25 Oman 0.00 2.74 2.74 0.00 2.10 2.10 0.00 2.82 2.82 m
26 Pakistan 0.00 19.10 19.10 0.00 17.11 17.11 0.00 14.66 14.66 -_ £3
27 Papua New
Guinea 0.00 6178 6.78 0.00 7.54 7.54 0.00 8.04 8.04 Q
28 Paraguay 0.00 12.63 t2.63 0.00 13.44 13.44 0.00 13.90 13.90 __
29 Portugal 0.00 3.14 3.14 0.00 2.82 2.82 0.00 1.9I i.91 O
30 SaudiArabia 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.95 0.95 c
31 Singapore 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.1t 0.11 0.00 0.15 0.15 z
32 South Africa 0.00 1.67 1.67 0.00 5.40 5.40 0.00 12.46 12.46 co
33 Spain 0.00 0.56 0.56 0.00 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.23 0.23
34 Sri Lanka 0.00 19.57 I9.57 0.00 20.63 20.63 0.00 20.39 20.39
35 Syria 0.00 29.08 29.08 0.00 27.24 27.24 0.00 28.65 28.65
36 Taiwan 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.16 0.16
37 Thailand 0.00 2.40 2.40 0.00 2.24 2.24 0.00 2.06 2.06
38 Tunisia 0.00 5.49 5.49 0.00 6.51 6.51 0.00 9.45 9.45
absolute average
underloverprediction * 11.45 11.34 11,35
39 Argentina 35.00 24.27 -10.73 53.00 23.36 -29.64 75.00 20.75 -54.25
40 Bolivia 94.00 45.01 -48.99 91.00 46.67 -44.33 89.00 46.00 -43.00
41 Brazail 25.00 13.44 -11.56 47.00 13.26 -33.74 53.00 10.26 -42.74
42 Chile 34.00 20.51 -13.49 37.00 20.99 -16.01 4t.00 19.33 :21.67
,-L
43 Colombia 18.33 6.67 -11.66 20.92 8.23 -f 2.69 34.44 7.36 -27.08Table 2 continued
Sampie 1988 1987 1988
countries A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D)
44 Costa Rica 56,00 33.82 -22.18 71.00 33.21 -37.79 87.00 31.41 -55.59
45 Ecuador 35.00 21.60 -13.40 56.00 18.88 -37.12 76.00 19.10 -56,90
46 Honduras 60.00 42.55 -17.45 66.00 40.27 -25.73 77.00 37.87 -39.13
47 Ivory Coast 25.00 18.20 -6.80 39.00 18.54 -20,46 71.00 17,76 -53.24
48 Mexico 44.00 7.79 -36.21 50.00 9.60 -40.40 57.00 16.37 -40.63
49 Morocco 30.00 22.59 -7.41 37.00 22.85 -14.15 50.00 22.59 -27.41
50 Nicaragua 96.00 49.99 -46.01 96.00 50.49 -45.51 98.00 50.32 -47.68
51 Panama 31.25 12.63 -18.62 43.58 14.18 -29.40 75.19 14.37 -60.82 c
52 Peru 81.00 25,60 -55.40 89.00 32.91 -56.09 94.00 34.28 -59.72 z
53 PhiUppines 36.00 26.14 -9.86 37.00 28.79 -8.21 48.00 24.14 -23.86
54 Senegal 32.00 32.15 0.15 39.00 29.5t -9.49 53.00 28.79 -24.21 O m
55 Uruguay 36.00 16.79 -19.21 32.00 17.65 -14.35 40.00 17.65 -22.35
56 Venezuela 24.00 9.24 -14.76 36.00 7.42 -28.58 49.00 9.24 -39.76 _
-10
absolute average -o
underloverprediction* 20,22 27,98 41.11 m
o
Note: A(D) - actual discount; P(D) - predicted discount; * - computed as average absolute difference between m m





Nicaragua, Mexico and Bolivia. In 1986, the average underprediction
of sovereign debt discounts registered at 20 percent and further
increased to 28 percent and 41 percent in 1987 and 1988, respectively.
Asawhole, the model based on bankers' creditworthiness assessments
tended to overpredict discounts of the unquoted Sovereign debt of
nonrescheduling countries and to underpredict those that have
actually been traded in the secondary market. This may be an early
indication that bankers, who are themselves the original holders of
most of the traded sovereign debts, attempted to protect their
exposure by overvaluing their portfolios. Although it appears that
secondary market sovereign debt prices are determined in a more
complex manner and cannot be directly generated just on the basis
of bankers' creditworthiness assessment alone, the significance of IICR
and its explanatory ability cannot be discounted.
Academic Model
The second regression equation may be referred to as an
"academic" model because it is estimated using the frequently used
variables in the country-risk literature to explain sovereign debt
discounts. The equation includes nine economic risk factors as
explanatory variables. Due to some missing data, only 144
observations were included, of which 37.5 percent (54/144) have
discounts greater than zero. The estimated result is given below:
DISC = 143.15 + 20.46 (RSKXtn) -2.07 (FDMPt.1) (8)
(3. 78) (8.39) (-3. 40)
- 0.19 (DSR,n) - 30.2 (RESIMPt_,) + 0.12 (INF,_,)
6.51) (-2.58) (4.03)
+ 6.63 (OPNINDX,.I) -0.93 (PCON_) - 2.8 (AGRGDPt__)
(0.20) (-1.86) (-5.21)114 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
- 14.08 (GNPPC_.I).
(-3.28)
R2= 0.65 Adjusted R2 = 0.63 Log-likelihood=-285.18
Of the nine risk indicators, only DSR and OPNINDX do not
significantly affect the sovereign debt discount. As expected,
cumulative rescheduling experience (RSKX) exhibits a positive and
highly significant coefficient. Note that it was only for two cases that
nonreschedulers' debt was quoted below par, that is, traded at a
discount. Debt claims on countries exhibiting a higher ratio of
noncompressible (food) imports to total imports tended to be quoted
at a lower discount, the estimated coefficient of FDMP being negative
and highly significant at 1 percent level. This result is consistent with
the idea that countries who use a major portion of their foreign
exchange on food imports are less likely to reschedule, hence, debt
claims against them would tend to retain their 100 percent face value.
The negative and highly significant effect of a country's reserve
position (RESIMP) is consistentwith the hypothesis. The insignificant
effect of the debt-service burden (DSR) may, however, imply that
bankers who are themselves the primary investors in the secondary
market tend to favor countries to which they have a large exposure
by downplaying the importance of a counU°y's external debt burden.
One implication of these findings from the point of view of the
borrowing country is that it might be shrewd to borrow internationally
and use the proceeds to increase foreign exchange reserves.
The positive and highly significant coefficient of INF which reflects
the country's price stability implies that secondary market investors
place great importance on the country's monetary policy in the
medium term. Debt claims on countries exhibiting high rates of
inflation tend to be quoted at higher discounts.PALAC-MCMIKEN: PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 115
The long-term structural variables PCON and AGRGDP have
negative and significant coefficients. This result is in contrast with
the earlier argument that countries which consume more (i.e., invest
less) and whose outputs are derived mainly from the agricultural sector
(high AGRGDP) are more likely to reschedule. Hence, they are
expected to have a positive effect on sovereign debt discount. But
presumably, countries with higher PCON and AGRGDP are the same
countries to which bankers were largely exposed. The same countries
eventually undertook rescheduling. In order to protect their assets,
bankers tend to quote debt claims against these countries at very low
discount rates to retain the full value of their debt claims. Finally, the
negative effect of GNPPC implies that debt claims against richer
countries would terad to be quoted at a lower discount.
As a whole, the objective risk factors explain over 65 percent of
the variation in DISC. The model exhibits a higher explanatory power
compared to the model which includes IICR as the only explanatory
variable. This is supported by the increasing value of the adjusted R2
and the log-likelihood function. This is likewise confirmed by the
model's prediction results as shown in Table 3.
The model correctly predicted more unquoted debt claims. Togo's
debt, on the other hand, was highly overpredicted, registering a
predicted discount of 28.77 percent, 10.36 percent and 24.05 percent
in 1986, 1987, and 1988, respectively, when it was in fact unquoted
during those years. The average overprediction of unquoted debt:
claims is down to just over 3 percent in 1986 and 1987 and 4.6 percent
in 1988.
In the case of traded and quoted debt claims in 1986, Argentinian,
Panamanian and Se_legalese debts were significantly overpredicted
by over 10 percent while the rest were underpredicted. Honduran
debt was highly underpredicted at 15.14 percent when in fact it was
traded at a discount,of 60 percent. The average absolute difference
between the actual and predicted discounts in 1986 was over 20
percent.Table 3 o_
ACADEMIC MODEL SOVEREIGN DEBT DISCOUNT PREDICTIONS
Sample 1986 1987 1988
countries A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D)
1 Algeria 0.00 7,04 7,04 0,00 0.45 0,45 0,00 0,49 0,49
2 Myanmar
(Burma) 0.00 0.0t 0.0I 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
'3 China 0.00 1.85 1.85 0.00 4.73 4.73 0.00 6.60 6.60
4 El Salvador 0.00 0.76 0.76 0.00 1.49 1.49 0.00 5.49 5.49
5 Ethiopia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13
6 Ghana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 Greece 0.00 0.45 0.45 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.06 0.06
8 Haiti 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.01 t._
9 Hungary 0.00 6.36 6.36 0.00 3.25 3.25 0.00 5.36 5.36 O
10 India 0.00 0.51 0.51 0.00 0.55 0.55 0.00 1.41 1.41 :_
11 Indonesia 0.00 6.22 6.22 0.00 4.27 4.27 0.00 5.30 5.30
r-
1-'2 Israel 0.00 8.45 8.45 0.00 3.15 3.15 0.00 2.46 2.46 O
13 Kenya 0.00 1.19 1.19 0.00 3.09 3.09 0.00 1.95 1.95 -n -o
14 Korea, South 0.00 12.93 12.93 0.00 16.06 16.06 0.00 16.50 16.50
15 Madagascar 0.00 11.93 11.93 0.00 16.96 16.96 0.00 31.55 31.55 _.E "O
16 Malaysia 0.00 2.36 2.36 0.00 2.72 2.72 0.00 3.31 3.31 _z
17 Mauritania 0.00 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.90 0.90 0.00 1.31 1.31 m
18 Mauritius 0.00 2.38 2.38 0.00 2.71 2.71 0.00 3.48 3.48 m(3
19 Oman 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.00 2.04 2.04 0.00 0.15 0.15 m <






Table 3 continued o
¢3
;¢
Sample 1986 1987 1988
m
countries A (D) P(D) P{D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) z
"0
"11
21 Papua New 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.06 m
Guinea -_ O
22 Paraguay 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.08 _z
23 Rwanda 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04
24 Singapore 0.00 1.56 1.56 0.00 1.24 1.24 0.00 0.91 0.91 o_ O3
25 Sri Lanka 0.00 0.58 0.58 0.00 0.62 0.62 0.00 0.48 0.48 c_
0
26 Syria 0.00 1.35 1.35 0.00 2.78 2.78 0.00 0.42 0.42 c
z
27 Thailand 0.00 13.89 13.89 0.00 14.07 14.07 0.00 15.70 15.70 -_
28 Togo 0.00 28.77 28.77 0.00 10.36 10.36 0.00 24.05 24.05 O3
29 Tunisia 0.00 5.28 5.28 0.00 5.67 5.67 0.00 5.69 5.69
absolute average
underloverprediction* 4.01 3.46 4.76
30 Argentina 35.00 48.90 13.90 53.00 39.51 -t3.49 75.00 61.76 -13.24
31 Bolivia 94.00 56.88 -37.12 9t.00 94.78 3.78 89.00 89.00 0.00
32 Brazil 25.00 33.32 8.32 47.00 47.10 0.10 53.00 81.99 28.99
33 Chile 34.00 28.70 -5.30 37.00 42.29 5.29 41.00 67.31 26.31
34 Colombia 18.33 5.83 -12.50 20.92 6.20 -14.72 34.44 7.58 -26.86
35 Costa Rica 56.00 20.70 -35.30 71.00 24.56 -46.44 87.00 33.33 -53_67
36 Ecuador 35.00 36.59 1.59 56.00 42.37 -13.63 76.00 64.71 -11.29
37 Honduras 60.00 I5.14 -44.86 66.00 16.83 -49.17 77.00 48.10 -28.90
38 ivory Coast 25.00 5.25 -19.75 39.00 12.35 -26.65 71.00 17.89 -53.11
39 Mexico 44.00 40.18 -3.82 50.00 73.52 23.52 57.00 73.54 16.54 •O_
Table 3 continued
Sample 1986 1987 1988
countries A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(O) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-AID)
40 Morocco 30.00 22.56 -7.44 37.00 31.10 -5.90 50.00 62.05 12.05
41 Nicaragua 96.00 63.40 -32.60 96.00 63.70 -32.30 98.00 69.59 -28.41
42 Panama 31.25 47.55 16.30 43.58 47.59 4.0t 75.19 61.63 -13.56
43 Peru 81.00 48.06 -32.94 89.00 74.39 -14.61 94.00 80.79 -13.21 =_
Philippines 36.00 5.48 -30.52 37.00 15.71 -21.29 48.00 36.55 -11.45 c ° 44
45 Senegal 32.00 55.67 23.67 39.00 77.13 38.13 53.00 72.79 19.79
46 Uruguay 36.00 21.00 -15.00 32.00 36.54 4.54 40.00 22.39 -t 7.61
47 Venezuela 24.00 0.27 -23.73 36.00 12.20 -23.80 49.00 16.26 -32.74 0
"tl
absolute average -o
undedoverprediction* 20.26 18.96 22.85 -- I--
.-Q
"U
Note: A(D) - actual discount; P(D) - predicted discount:
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In 1987, the model's overpredictions of quoted debt claims were
all below 6 percent except that for Senegal which was overpredicted
by 38.13 percent. The model almost correctly predicted Brazilian
debt with a difference ofjust 0.10 percent. Honduran and Costa Rican
debts were highly underpredicted by over 45 percent. But on the
average, the model's absolute under- and overpredictions of quoted
debt claims in 1987 stood at 18.96 percent.
Finally for 1988, the model correctly predicted Bolivian debt at
89 percent discount. Debt claims on Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Morocco,
and Senegal were underpredicted by at least 12 percent while the
rest of the quoted debt claims were overpredicted. On the average,
the model's absolute under- and overpredictions of quoted debt claims
registered at 22.65 percent in 1988.
The "academic" model appeared to show better predictive power
than the "subjective" model. Average absolute under- and
overprediction exhibited dramatic declines though the model still
tended to overpredict unquoted claims and to underpredict quoted
claims. What is obvious, however, is that sovereign debt discounts
have an objective basis and cannot be entirely influenced by bankers'
perceptions. But one should note that IICR itself may have an objective
basis. This problem will be dealt with in a subsequent regression.
"Subj eetive-cum-Academic" Model
Finally, the third regression equation may be referred to as a
"subjective-cum-academic" model because it includes all the economic
and subjective risk factors as explanatory variables of sovereign debt
discounts. In this model, however, one is confronted with tile problem
that if both the IICR, and the several objective indicators of country
risk are included as independent variables, major muldcollinearity
will result because IICR itself is a function of the same economic risk
factors. This therefore complicates the individual variables' effect oil
secondary market sovereign debt discounts. The inclusion of the120 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ostensibly all-inclusive IICR and the objective risk indicators will dilute
the validity of the estimated coefficients. To avoid this problem, a
two-step procedure was used. First, IICR was regressed against country-
risk indicators. These variables reflect solvency proxied by the ratio
of total debt to GNP (TDGNP), liquidity proxied by the ratio of total
reserves minus gold to total imports (RESTDSMP), loan duration
(AVGMTY), inflation (INF), share of exports to GDP (EXPGDP),
share of investment in GDP (INVGDP), share of agriculture in GNP
(AGRGDP), and GNP per capita (GNPPC). The residuals from the
first step (RIICR), (i.e., the unexplained portion of the IICR) were
saved. In the second step, the objective indicators of country risk and
the residuals from the first regression were used as independent
variables to explain the secondary market sovereign debt discount.
While the IICR equation was estimated on a set of 255 observations,
due to missing data, the Tobit DISC model was estimated using only
108 observations, of which 50 percent (54/108) have a positive
dependent variable. The estimated results are given below. J
IICR = 15.89- 7.76(TDGNP,.I) + 19.38(RESTDSMPt_,) (9.1)
(3.75) (-5.69) (4.61)
- 0.32 (AVGMTY,._) - 0.79 (INF_,)
(-3.79) (-1.06)
+ 2.82 (EXPGDP_._) + 1.00(INVGDP _)
(0.91) (10.42)
- 0.03 (AGRGDPt.) + 0.67 (GNPPC,.2).
(-0.,31) (. 76)
R2-- 0.63 Adj. R'2= 0.62 Log-likelihood = -937.37
1. For further discussion of the IICR results, see Palac-McMiken (1993).PALAC-MCMIKEN: PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 121
DISC = 60.43-0.86 (RIICR) + 17.18 (RSKXt,1) (9.2)
(3.45) (-3.40) (12.27)








+ 0.06 (INF_,) - o.a7 (PCON4)
(3.71) (-3.54)
R2= 0.88 Adj. R" = 0.87 Log-likelihood =-238.43
The first equation indicates that bankers' creditworthiness
assessments are likewise influenced by economic risk factors. The
latter account for over 60 percent of the variation in IICR. Hence,
about 40 percent of bankers' creditworthiness assessments may be
accounted for by nonquandfiable perceptions of a country's political,
social, legal and environmental risks otherwise not captured by the
included explanatory variables.
For the Tobit model determining the influence variables of DISC,
some of the economic risk factors were dropped because of
multicollinearity problems. Now consider the RIICR. It is highly
significant at the 1 percent level. This implies that the unexplained
portion of IICR which presumably embodies political and other
noneconomic dimensions of country risk not encompassed by the
"objective" risk indicators is an important determinaut of sovereign
debt discount. In fact, this already excludes any perceived
geographical risk because the equation separately includes
geographical dummies to isolate their influence. The sample countries
were classified into four geographical regions. To avoid the dumrny122 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
variable trap, Europe and the Mediterranean region were dropped.
It appears that the Latin American and Caribbean debt tended to be
quoted at a discount which is at least 25 percent higher than that for
European and Mediterranean debt. The dummy for the former region
is the single most important determinant of sovereign debt discount.
This may be attributed to the fact that, except for the Philippines.
and two other African countries, the secondary market was dominated
by trading of Latin American debts. With very few exceptions, all
Latin American debts have been quoted at a discount. Dummy
variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and for the Asian and the Pacific
regions on the other hand, do not exhibit any significant effect.
Cumulative rescheduling experience (RSKX) still exhibits a very
strong positive and significant effect second only to the dummy
variable for Latin America.
All the economic risk factors retained their signs. The insignificant
effect of DSR further verifies the earlier finding that bankers who are
the original holders of debt presumed to be the principal investors
in the secondary market, tended to ignore and, in effect, downplay
the risk of heavy debt burden in their attempt to protect their own
lending exposures. FDMP and RESIMP have both negative and
insignificant effects while INF has a positive effect, all of which are
consistent with earlier findings. PCON, on the other hand, exhibits a
negative effect which is inconsistent with what is expected. This
negative effect is too strong to ignore, and it was noted that the same
effect was generated in an earlier regression equation, which only
included the objective determinants of risk as explanatory variables.
As has been argued, the most likely explanation for this is the fact
that countries with a lower propensity to invest are most likely the
same countries to which bankers' exposures eventually turned sour.
Bankers would try to protect their portfolios by continuing to retain
their debt claims against these countries at a 100 percent face value.
Looking at the predictive performance of the model estimated
in Table 4, it is apparent that this model has the best predictive abilit_Table 4 --o
SUBJECTIVE-CUM-OBJECTIVE MODEL SOVEREIGN DEBT _o DISCOUNT PREDICTIONS
o
Sample 1986 1987 1988 _E
countries A(O) P(D} P(D)-A(D} A (O) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) m z
1 Algeria 0.00 7.04 7.04 0.00 0.45 0,45 0.00 0.49 0.49 -o :0
1 Algeria 0.00 1.80 1,80 0.00 0.08 0.08 0,00 0.25 0.25 m
2 China 0.00 1.18 1.18 0,00 2.84 2,84 0.00 4.73 4.73 o
3 El Salvador 0.00 5.06 5,06 0.00 6.80 6,80 0.00 10.95 10.95
4 Ethiopia 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0,01 0.00 2.52 2.52
5 Haiti 0.00 1.66 1.66 0.00 4.70 4.70 0.00 0.98 0.98
6 India 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.24 0.24 8
7 Indonesia 0.00 1.88 1.88 0.00 1.16 1.16 0.00 1.63 1.63 z c
8 Kenya 0.00 0.53 0.53 0.00 3.65 3.65 0.00 1.11 1,11 co
9 Korea, South 0.00 1.46 1.46 0.00 1.51 1.51 0.00 1.60 1.60
10 Malaysia 0.00 0.16 0.16 0,00 0.38 0.38 0.00 0,75 0.75
11 Mauritius 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.00 1.28 1.28
12 Oman 0.00 1.26 1.26 0.00 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.23 0.23
13 Pakistan 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.70 0,70
14 Papua New 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0,09 0.09
Guinea
15 Paraguay 0.00 1.83 1.83 0.00 3.20 3.20 0,00 4.11 4.11
16 Sri Lanka 0.00 0.22 0.22 0,00 0.16 0.I6 0.0O 0,18 0.18
17 Thailand 0.00 0.34 0,34 0,00 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.45 0.45
I8 Tunisia 0.00 0,57 0.57 0,00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
absolute average
under/overprediction * 1.04 1.49 1.82
coTable 4 continued _o
Sample 1986 1987 1988
countries A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(O) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D) A (D) P(D) P(D)-A(D)
19 Argentina 35.00 47.26 12.26 53.00 43.54 -9,46 75,00 61,65 -13.35
20 Bolivia 94.00 74.13 -19,87 91.00 93.17 2.17 89,00 87.45 -t,55
21 Brazil 25.00 39.63 14.63 47.00 50.57 3.57 53.00 87.87 34.87
22 Chile 34.00 33.29 -0.71 37.00 40.41 3.41 41.00 65.82 24.82
23 Colombia 18.33 15.32 -3.01 20.92 15.64 -5.28 34.44 19.04 -15.40
24 Costa Rica 56.00 57.08 t.08 71.00 62.35 L8.65 87.00 59.47 -27.53
25 Ecuador 35.00 45.34 10.34 56.00 50.06 -5.94 76.00 73.78 -2.22
26 Honduras 60.00 53.68 -6.32 66.00 50.82 -15.18 77.00 71.18 -5.82
27 Ivory Coast 25.00 10.69 -14.31 39.00 23.70 -15.30 71.00 33.77 -37.23
28 Mexico 44.00 51.94 7.94 50.00 77.62 27.62 57.00 76.22 19.22
29 Morocco 30.00 19.07 -10.93 37.00 26.54 -10.46 50.00 47.58 -2.42
30 Nicaragua 96.00 92.22 -3.78 96.00 90.75 -5.25 98.00 91.31 -6.69 c_n
31 Panama 31.25 44.75 13.50 43.58 48.75 5.17 75.19 57.41 -17.78 _>
32 Peru 81.00 64.64 -16.36 89.00 83.94 -5.06 94.00 92.90 -1.10 t- O
33 Philippines 36.00 6.24 -29.76 37.00 13.44 -23.56 48.00 31.55 -16.45 -11 "O
34 Senegal 32.00 37.90 5.90 39.00 63.97 24.97 53.00 63.58 10.58 __
35 Uruguay 36.00 20.88 -15.12 32.00 37.63 5.63 40.00 30.69 -9.31 -o--"
36 Venezuela 24.00 0.59 -23.41 36.00 20.32 -15.68 49.00 34.69 -14.31 -o z
absolute average m
under/overprediction * 11.62 10.69 14.48
<
m
Note: A(D) - actual discount; P(D) - predicted discount
• computed as average absolute difference between predicted and actual discount. ._
m
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compared to the ones discussed earlier. Except for E1 Salvador, the
model's underpredictions of unquoted debt claims were all below 5
percent.
The average underpredictions during the period covered were
just over 1 percent. These can be interpreted as almost correct
predictions.
For 1986, in the case of quoted debt claims, Philippine debt was
highly underpredicted, registering a predicted discount of only 6.25
percent when in fact it was traded at a discount of 36 percent. It
appears that the secondary market may have reacted to the political
turmoil in the country at that time, even when the objective
determinants themselves were not significantly affected. Except for
Venezuela, all the other underpredictions were below 20 percent.
Chilean debt was almost correctly predicted; on the average, the
model's absolute under- and overprediction wasjust over 10 percent.
The predictive performance of tile model with respect to
unquoted debt claims for 1987 registered an absolute average under-
and overprediction of 10.69 percent. Philippine debt is still highly
underpredicted by about 23.56 percent while Mexican and Senegal
debts were overpredicted by 27.62 and 24.97 percent, respectively.
Finally for 1988, the model's predictions showed an absolute
average under- and overpredictions of quoted debt claims by 14.48
percent. Brazilian and Chilean debts were highly overpredicted by
34.87 and 24.82 percent, respectively, while Ivory Coast's debt is
underpredicted by 37.23 percent. Bolivian and Peruvian debts were
almost correctly predicted with a difference ofjust over 1 percent.
For this model, Table 5 lists the out-of-sample predictions for 1989.
The prediction results do not deviate significantly from the within-
sample predictions exhibiting comparably similar performance.
Although with respect to unquoted debt claims, the average absolute
difference between actual discounts (assumed to be zero) and the
predicted registered for this equation appears to be slightly higher,O_
Table 5
SUBJECTIVE-CUM-OBJECTIVE MODEL OUT-OF-SAMPLE SOVEREIGN DEBT
DISCOUNT PREDICTIONS
Sample countries Rescheduling history 1989
A(D) P(D) P(D)-A(D}
1 China None 0.00 11.98 11.98
2 Ethiopia None 0.00 l 1.60 11,60
3 Haiti None 0:00 13.25 13.25
4 india None 0.00 -1.05 -1.05
5 Indonesia None 0.00 3.95 3.95 ¢._
6 Kenya None 0.00 2.83 2.83 cO
7 Korea, South None 0.00 4.27 4.27 z _
8 Malaysia None 0.00 2.40 2.40
9 Mauritius None 0.00 8.01 8.01 O
10 Pakistan None 0.00 8.22 8.22 -n -o
11 Papua New Guinea None 0.00 -1.33 -t.33 __.
12 Paraguay None 0.00 17.80 17.80 -or-
13 Sri Lanka None 0.00 0.39 0.39 __-°
14 Thailand None 0.00 -2.06 -2,06 m
15 Tunisia None 0.00 -5.46 -5.46 m _
<::
absolute average m f-
underloverprediction * 6.31 o "0
m
ZTable 5 continued -o
>
f-
Sample countries Rescheduling history 1989
A(D) P{D) P(D)-A(D) c_
16 Algeria None 23.00 1.75 -21.25 m
17 Argentina 1983, 1985, 1987,1989 35.00 61.40 26.40
18 Bolivia 1980,1981,1983, 1986, 1988,1990 94.00 87.83 -6.17
19 Brazil 1983. 1984,1986,1987, 1988 25.00 83.94 58.94 o_ c)
20 Chile 1983,1984, t985, 1987, 1988, 1990 34.00 69.29 35=29 _,
21 Costa Rica 1983, 1985, 1989 56.00 60.48 4.48 _)
22 Ecuador 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989 35.00 70.41 35.41 o_
23 Honduras 1983, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1990 60.00 64.57 4.57
24 Mexico 1983, 1984,1985,1986, 1987, t988, 1989, 1990 44.00 83.09 39.09 c 0
25 Morocco 19083, 1985, t986, 1987, 1988, 1990 30.00 55.14 25.14 z
26 Peru 1978,1980, 1.983, 1984 81.00 89.27 8.27 u_
27 Philippines 1984, 1986, 1987,1987, 1990 36.00 42.13 6.13
28 Senegal 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1989, 1990 32.00 61.01 29.0t
29 Uruguay 1983, 1986.1988 36.00 33.67 -2.33
30 Venezuela 1986. 1987. 1988, 1990 24.00 50,98 26.98
absolute average
under/overprediction * 14,58
A(D) - actual discount
P(D) - predicted discount
• computed as average absolute difference between predicted and actula discount,128 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
registering at 6.31 percent. The model overpredicts two Latin
American debts, that of Paraguay and Haiti at 17.8 and 13.25 percent,
respectively. None of these debt claims were traded; hence,
presumably their face values retained their 100 percent face values in
the lenders' books. Itappears that the secondary market failed to
reflect the obvious decline in the face values of debt claims against
Latin American countries.
While the model seems to capture the political turmoil in China
by registering a discount of almost 12 percent, the secondary market
failed to also reflect this development. The same goes for Ethiopian
debtwith a predicted discount of over 10 percent. The model registers
some negative discounts for Thailand, Tunisia and Indonesia,
probably due to some linear approximation, but they could just as
well be taken as zero discounts. As for the quoted debt claims, except
for three Latin American countries and Senegal, the model
underpredicts most of the sovereign debt discounts. The debts of
Brazil, Chile and Mexico were traded at 70, 40 and 64 percent
discounts, respectively; the model, however, estimates the discount
to be higher at 84, 70 and 83 percent, respectively. Senegal's debt is
also overpredicted by 8 percent. For the traded sovercign debts, the
model's average absolute difference between the actual discounts and
predicted discounts stood at 14.5 percent. The model almost correctly
predicts discounts on Bolivian and Moroccan debt with underpre-
dictions of less than 2 percent.
VI
CONCLUSION
As a whole, results show the importance of both bankers' "subjective"
creditworthiness perceptions and "objective" economic dimensions
of country risk in the determination of secondary market sovereign
debt discounts. Although a model based on bankers' creditworthinessPALAC-MCMIKEN: PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 129
assessment alone cannot entirely predict sovereign debt discounts, it
could exhibit reasonable predictive performance if coupled with
various economic dimensions of objective country risk. From the
absolute differences in the actual and the predicted discounts, the
model appears to be more efficient in predicting unquoted debt
claims. Within sample, the average absolute under- and overprediction
of unquoted debt claims registered at less than 2 percent compared
to average absolute over- and underprediction of quoted debt claims
of about 12 percent. Out-of-sample observations exhibited a similar
trend.
The secondary market is still highly illiquid. Traded debt papers
consist mainly of sovereign debts from heavily indebted countries.
Moreover, the principal participants remain to be the original holders
of debt, swapping debt papers among themselves in their desire to
restructure their porttolio. Thus, the subjective bias of these principal
investors are likely to remain. Nonetheless, the performance of the
"subjective-cum-objective" model does provide evidence that
secondary market sovereign debt prices largely reflect their true
economic values, despite the subjective biases of bankers who
eventually participate as investors in the secondary market,130 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abassi, B. and R.J. Taffier. "Counu"y Risk: A Model of Economic Performance
Related to Debt-Servicing Capacity." Working Paper No. 36. London:
City University Business School, 1982.
Angelini, A. et al. Inter-national Lending, Risk and the Eurommkets. London:
Macmillan, 1979.
Armendariz de AghiOn, B. "International Debt: An Explanation of the
Commercial Banks' Lending Behavior After 1982."J0urnal ofInternational
Economics 28 (1990): 173-86.
Berg, A. andJ. Sachs_ "The Debt Crisis: Structural Explanations of Country
Performance." Working Paper No. 2607. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988.
Bird, G. Loan-LossProvisions and Third WorldDebt.Princeton, NJ.: International
Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1989.
Bulow, J. and K. Rogoff. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive to Forget?" The
American Economic Revier_ 79, 1 (March 1986): 43-50.
Callier, E "Further Results on Countries' Debt Servicing Performance: The
Relevance of Structural Factors." Weltwit'tschaftliches Archiv 121 (1985):
105-15.
Calverl),J. Country Risk Analysis. Sychaey: Butterwortbs, 1990.
Clark, E. Cross Border"Investment Risk: Application of Modern Portfolio Theo'ry.
Londoia: Euromoney, 1991.
Cline, W. R. InternationaI Debt:Systematic Risk and Poliu Response.Washington,
D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1984.
Cohen, D. "is the Discount on the Secondary Market a Case for Debt Relief?."
Mimeographed. Paris and CEPR, London: Universite de Nancy - II
CEPREMAP, 1988.
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz. "LDC Participation in International Financial
Markets." JouTnal ofDevelopment Economics 7 (1980) : 3-2l.
Edwards, S."The Pricing of Bonds and Bank Loans in International Markets:
An Empirical Analysis of Developing Countries' Foreign Borrowing."
Eu,ropean Economic Review 30 (1986): 565-89.PALAC*MCMIKEN: PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 131
Feder, G. and R. E.Just. "Optimal International Borrowing, Capital Allocation
and Creditworthiness Conu-ol." Kreclitwn.dKapita[ 12, 2 (1979): 207-20_
. "A Study of Debt-Servicing Capacity Applying Logit Analysis."
Journal of Development Economics 4,i (1977) : 25-38_
, and K. Ross. "Projecting Debt-Service Capacity of Developing
Countries." Journal of Financial and Quantitative A'n, alysis 16, 5 (1981 ):
651-71.
Frank, C. R, and W, R. Cline. "Measurement of"Debt Servicing Capacity: An
Application of Discriminall tAalalysis. "Jo.u:rna,! qH_d.ernatiorzalEconomics 1
(1971): 32%44.
Gadjdeczka, E and M. Stone_ ''The Secondary Mm'ket l:brDeveloping Country
Loans." Finance a'r_d Dcwelopment (December 1990): 22-25.
Golberger, A. "Linear Regression After Selection."[o'urnal o[Ecorl.omet, rics 15
(1981): 357-66.
Greene, W. H. Econometric Analysis. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1981.
"On the Asymptotic Bias ol the Ordinary Least Squares
Estimator ofthe Tobit Model." Eco'n.ometrica49 (1981): 505-13.
Grossman, H. I, andJ, B.Van Huyck. "Sovereign Deh_ as a Contingent Claim:
Excusable Default, Repudiation and Reputation." Working Paper No_
85-17. Providence, Rhode Island: Department of Economics, Brown
University, 1985.
Guttentag, J. M. and R. J. Herring. Accou'nti'n.gJor Losses o.n.Sove'mign.Debt:
Implications.[or New Lending" Princeton, N:].: Inter,_ational Finance
Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1988.
Institutional Investor, Inc. Th.elm-til.utio_.alI.nvestcmNew York. various issues_
International Monetary Fund. h',.tt:rnational Finan.cial Stat.istics. Washington,
DC: IMF, various issues.
Kharas, H. "The Long-Run Credit'worthiness of Developing Countries: Theory
and Practice." The Quart¢rlyJou,rnal o[Economic_ (August .1984): 413-39.
Mayo A. L. and A. G. Barett. "An Early Warning Model for Assesing
Developing Country Risk." in S. H. Goodman (ed.) l_i'rzancingand Risk
in,Developing Countries. Based on the Proceediugs of a Sylnposium on132 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Developing Countries' Debt sponsored by the Export-Import Bank of
the United States. New York: Praeger, 1978.
McFadden, D., R. Eckaus et al. "Is There Lilie Alter Debt? Aa_ Economic
Analysis of the Creditworthiness of l)evelopil_g Countries." In Smith and
Cuddington (eds.) lnternational Debt and tb.e Devdoping Countries_
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 1985.
Palac-McMiken, E. D. "Aal Empirical Investigation of Leaders' Perception of
Country Creditworthiness." Working Pape,- No. 118. Department of
Economics, University of Auckland, North Island, New Zealand, 1993.
• Rescheduling; Creditwo'rt, hi'n,ess and Ma'rket Prices. Avebury,
Aldershot, Hants, 1995.
Payer, C. Lent and .Lost: Foreig'n Credit and 7"hi'rd World Development. London
Adantic Highlands, N:I.: Zed Books, 1991.
Robinson III,J. D. and A. H. Barrels_ "Comprelaensive Approaches for Solving
the Debt Crisis_" In Bogdanowics-Binde,q (ed.) Solving tb.e Global Debt
Crisis: Strategies and Contrmlmsie.s by Kin' Sta,hehold_.*_'s, htstitutional Investor
Series in Finance. New York: Institutio,,al Investor, 1989.
Sachs, J.D. (ed.). Developing Co'u,',,tr_'Debt a.,J,d the Wo.d,dEco,J,om_'. Chicago. IL:
National Bureau of Economic Research Report, The Universiw of
Chicago Press, 1989.
Saini, K. G. and E S. Bates, '% Survey of the Quantitative Approaches to
Country Risk Analysis."Jour'nal q/Banking and Finance 8 (1984) : 341-56.
Sand, O. C. "Country Risk and Pricing of Eurocredits to Developing
Countries: Au Empirical Investigation." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
Los Angeles: The University of Calitb,'uia, 1987.
Sargen, N. "Economic Indicators and Country RiskAppraisal."Ec0n0micReview
of the Federal Reserve Ba*d¢ oJ San Francisco (1977) : 1.9-35.
Schmidt, R. "Early Warning of Debt Reschcduling." Journal of Banking and
Finance 8 (1984): 357-70.
Smith, G. W. andJ. T. Cuddington (eds_). Inl,er',.ationalDebtand lheDc*veloping
Countries, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1985_
Solberg, R. Sow_,reig'u,Re.sclt,ed'ali'ug: Risk a.ad Por!/olio Managc'm, ent. London:
Unwin, Hyman, 1988.PALAC-MCMIKEN: PREDICTING DISCOUNTS 133
Solnik, B. H. '_I'he International Pricing of Risk: An Empirical Investigation
of the World Capital Market Structnre."]ourrud ojFirl,a'n.ce(1974): 365-
78.
Stone, M. "Are Sovereign Debt Secondary Market Returns Sensitive to
Macroeconomic Fundamentals?: Evidence from the Coutemporary and
interwar Markets." Journal oflnt_;,'national Mo_uy and Finance 10 (1991 ) :
S101-S122.
Walter, I. "Country Risk Portfolio Decisious and Regtflations in International
Lending."J0urnal of Banking and Finance.5 (March 1981 ) : 77-92.
The World Bank. '_World Debt Tables." Washington, D. C.: The World Bank,
various issues.
The World Bank. World Development Report. New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press for The World Bauk, various issues.